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NOTES

Res Judicata in the Derivative Action: Adequacy of
Representation and the Inadequate Plaintiff
I. INTRODUCTION
A shareholder whose interest1 in the corporation has been injured
may seek redress through one of three forms of action. Selection of
the proper vehicle is not a matter of discretion but is dictated by the
nature of the interest violated: 2 if the injury directly affects a shareholder, the proper avenue is a personal action for damages; 3 when
that same injury is inflicted on a larger group of shareholders, a class
action may be the appropriate remedy; 4 however, if only the corporation is directly injured, the proper recourse is a derivative suitan equitable action5 brought by a shareholder on a cause of action
belonging to,6 but unenforced by, the corporation.7 The scope of the
I. A shareholder's "interest" in a corporation relates to the assets and profit
potential of the enterprise. While there are various supplemental rights attendant
upon ownership, see generally 13 w. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1970),
the primary concern of this Note is with acts by corporate directors or others who,
through mismanagement, embezzlement, fraud, or violation of regulatory statutes,
diminish the corporate assets or create a potential for such diminution.
2. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971). See generally 6 s. THOMPSON & J. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS § 4560
(3d ed. 1927).
3. See, e.g., Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898 (1948)
(plaintiff induced to abandon personal activities and work for defendant in expectation
of sharing profits); Nathanson v. Murphy, 132 Cal. App. 2d 363, 282 P.2d 174 (1955)
(defendant misrepresented size of ranch purchased with plaintiff's funds on behalf of
corporation).
4. See, e.g., Brill v. Blakeley, 281 App. Div. 532, 120 N.Y.S.2d 713 (1953), afjd., 308
N.Y. 951, 127 N.E.2d 96 (1955) (plaintiff, on behalf of all preferred stockholders,
sought to enjoin common stockholders from reducing par value of preferred stock).
5. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). The Court reasoned that derivative
actions were of such unusual nature as to require the extraordinary remedies pro•
vided by a court of equity, and held equity to be the proper court for all cases arising
out of injuries inflicted on the corporation itself. Earlier, in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 331 (1855), plaintiff sought to enjoin the payment of taxes assessed against
the State Bank of Ohio in violation of the bank's charter. The Court held equity
jurisdiction proper insofar as an injunction was sought.
Equity jurisdiction of derivative suits had traditionally resulted in a denial of trial
by jury, even though had the corporation brought the action in its own behalf at law
a jury would have been proper on demand. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b). In Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531 (1969), the Supreme Court eliminated this anomaly by authorizing jury
trials in derivative actions.
6. See N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 349-50 (1959). Since a corporation is a separate
entity capable of suing and being sued in its own behalf, an injury done to it is
properly redressed by the entity. It is irrelevant that the plaintiff is the sole shareholder
of the corporation. Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1969). The fact that the
injury was sustained by the corporation denies plaintiff personal standing to bring the
action.
7. E.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 454 (1881); Ogden v. Gilt Edge Consol.
Mines Co., 225 F. 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1915).
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derivative action is broader than either a personal suit or a class
action. The derivative plaintiff represents not only the corporation
in its suit against the wrongdoer, but also the interests of all shareholders in vindicating the corporation's legal rights. 8 Since the derivative suit enforces corporate claims, damages generally inure
directly to the corporation, not to the shareholders.9 By permitting
shareholders to institute legal action upon default of the corporation's management, the availability of the derivative suit serves as a
check on the activities of corporate directors.10
The early history of the shareholder suit reveals that its deterrent
potential was diminished as parties agreed to private settlements in
which the defendant bought the plaintiff's consent to the entry of
an adverse judgment.11 As the sum demanded for the plaintiff's
acquiescence was often less than the cost of defense, corporate directors were likely to accede to such demands and thereby inadvertently
encourage suits on even the most specious of derivative claims. Because such agreements carried res judicata effect and were often
injurious to both the corporation and nonparty shareholders,12 various statutes and rules were adopted to regulate the conduct of the
action.18 Thus, before the suit may begin, the plaintiff is commonly
required to demonstrate shareholder status at the time of the suit
and at the time of the alleged ·wrongdoing,14 and to guarantee de-

s. E.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1969); Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 626, 627 (1873); Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 255-56 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); H. HENN, CoRPORATIONs 751 (2d ed. 1970); N. LAT11N,
supra note 6, at 349-50.
9. E.g., Erlich v. Glasner, 418 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1969); Norte &: Co. v. Huflins, 416
F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946); Keenan v.
Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904, 120 A.LR. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1938). But see Perlman
v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). See generally N. LArnN, supra note 6, at 378-80.
There are also several practical reasons for awarding derivative damages to the
corporation. Among these are creditors' claims to recover on debts which the corporation could not pay prior to the judgment award, see N. LArnN, supra, at 378-80, and
the need to satisfy the tax liability assessed against so much of the recovery as was not
previously included in the corporation's gross income. See Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp.
432 (D. Iowa 1946). Cf. General American Investors v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434
(1954); Arcadia Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1941).
10. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966); N. LATIIN, supra
note 6, at 349-50.
11, See, e.g., Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947); Beadleston v.
Alley, 55 Hun 606, 7 N.Y.S. 747 (Sup. Ct. 1889), appeal dismissed, 119 N.Y. 659, 23 N.E.
1150 (1890). For early criticisms of the derivative suit, see F. Woon, SURVEY AND REPORT
REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE Surrs (1944) [hereinafter WOOD REPORT]; McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder To Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE
L.J. 421 (1937).
12. See, e.g., ·woon REPORT, supra note 11, at 21-25, McLaughlin, supra note 11,
at 435.
13. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.I; DEL. CHAN. CT. R. 23.I; MICH. GEN. CT. R. 208.4;
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 834 (West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 626 (McKinney 1963); N.Y.
GEN. CoRP. LAw §§ 60-6lb (McKinney Supp. 1972).
14. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CHAN. CT. R. 23.1; MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 208.4. Such
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fendant's legal expenses,15 or, in some jurisdictions, meet minimum
shareholding requirements.16 Although primarily designed to protect
the corporation from the "strike" suit, these and other requirements17
a requirement precludes the possibility that stock will be purchased solely to initiate
the action. An exception to this general rule accords standing to a current shareholder
who purchased stock without notice after the occurrence of an action that creates a continuing and current wrong. Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Winkleman
v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). The "contemporaneous ownership" rule has generally been regarded as a procedural requirement. Thus, a derivative
suit brought in federal court by a noncomplying shareholder will be dismissed though
the governing state substantive law had no comparable provision. 13 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 1, § 5981.
An interesting problem was presented in Bateson v. Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970). Plaintiff had planned to initiate a
derivative suit but had "accidentally" sold all his stock before the action had
begun. Later, stock was reacquired and the suit brought on the continuing wrong
theory. The court granted standing and held that a shareholder knowing of corporate
wrongdoing who "by mistake" sells all of his stock can later reacquire shares and bring
the action despite the fact that that purchaser had notice of the wrongdoing. Thus, the
point in time of ownership test seeks to ·bar champertous plaintiffs, see Bateson v.
Magna Oil Corp., 414 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970);
Vann v. Industrial Processes Co., 247 F. Supp. 14, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1965); Sayles v. White,
18 Misc. 155, 158, 41 N.Y.S. 1063, 1064 (Sup. Ct.), revd. on other grounds, 18 App. Div.
590, 46 N.Y.S. 194 (1896); WooD REPORT, supra note 11, at 116, or parties seeking improperly to confer jurisdiction, see Amar v. Garnier Enterprises, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 211, 215
(D.C. Cal. 1966); H. BALLANTINE, CORl'ORATIONS § 190a (1927).
15. E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 384 (West 1955); MICH GEN. CT. R. 208.4 (1968). Cf.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (federal courts must apply
state's security-for-expenses rule in diversity cases).
16. N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw §§ 60-6lb (McKinney Supp. 1972). Section 6l(b) (Security
for Expenses) requires that the derivative plaintiff post a security bond, but only if
that plaintiff holds less than five per cent of the outstanding stock or the value of the
shares held is less than 50,000 dollars. The restriction was not intended to foreclose any
right but to protect the corporation from suit by a shareholder with only a minimal
interest. See Governor's Memorandum on Approving L. 1944 c. 668, in N.Y. GEN. CoRl'.
LAw § 61b (McKinney Supp. 1972). For a criticism of the New York rule, see Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1947).
17. A shareholder may also be precluded from pursuing the corporate cause of action if he fails to exhaust intracorporate remedies by demanding that the corporation
seek redress on its own behalf. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.l; DEL. CHAN. CT. R. 23.1; CAL.
CoRP. CODE § 834(a)(2) (West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 626 (McKinney 1963). Presumably, such a requirement is based on the notion that the cause at issue is an asset
of the corporation and is most properly vindicated by the officers of that entity. See
note 6 supra. When the directors are also the alleged wrongdoers, however, such a demand would be patently futile and is not required. Delaware &: Hudson Co. v. Albany
&: S.R.R., 213 U.S. 435, 451-53 (1909); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223,
1228 (10th Cir. 1970). See also In re Penn-Central Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026,
1039 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Sachs v. American Fletcher Natl. Bank&: Trust Co., - Ind.-,
-, 279 N.E.2d 807, 8ll (1972) (demand on trustees of a bankrupt corporation).
Assuming that the shareholder satisfies requirements of his own qualifications to
litigate the action, it is further required that the corporation be joined as a party.
Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626 (1873); Philipar v. Derby, 85 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1936); ·Marcus v. Textile Banking Co., 38 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). If the court is
unable to assert jurisdiction over the corporation or if the plaintiff fails to join the
corporation, the suit is dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party. Lucking v.
Welbilt Corp., 353 Mich. 373, 91 N.W.2d 346 (1958). Generally, the shareholder may
refile his complaint in a jurisdiction able to assert its power over the corporation, as-
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furthered the adequacy of the derivative suit by barring the champertous plaintiff and the spurious cause of action.
Even assuming that all preconditions are satisfied, however, it is
important that the derivative plaintiff be an adequate representative
if the corporate cause is to be fully litigated before the entry of a
final judgment. Because traditional res judicata principles prohibit
the splitting of a single cause of action between several successive
suits, the corporate claims are either barred or merged after a judgment on the merits as to all issues which were litigated or which
might have been litigated in the initial action.18 In defining a "cause
of action" 19 within the context of the derivative action, or any other
action, the courts have looked beyond the theory on which the
plaintiff has based his claim for relief to the facts comprising the
alleged offense.20 A substantial identity of operative facts between
the two actions will generally result in the application of res judicata
to bar the second suit.
Thus, the derivative plaintiff is able to foreclose all future litigation by other shareholders21 or the corporation's directors,22 by obtaining a judgment on the merits23 of the corporate cause. Despite
suming that jurisdiction authorizes a derivative suit. In Levine v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch.
597,219 A.2d 145 (Ch. 1966), however, the Delaware court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the corporation, and Panama, the proper jurisdiction, did not permit derivative suits.
As a practical matter, joinder of the corporation as a party necessary to the action
effectuates a dual purpose. First, inclusion establishes that the corporate directors are
at least aware of the pendency of the suit and consciously forewent the opportunity to
initiate the action. More importantly, the corporation is an indispensible party so that
it may be bound by the derivative judgment. Inasmuch as damages in such an action
inure to the benefit of the corporation and not to the shareholders, see note 9 supra
and accompanying text, it is vital that the corporation be prevented from recovering
the same damages in a subsequent suit brought on its own behalf.
18. E.g., Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927); Mendez v. Bowie, 118
F.2d 435 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 639 (1941). See generally ID J. MooRE,
FEDERAL PRAcnCE CJ o.401 (2d ed. 1965).
19. See ID J. MooRE, supra note 18, ,r 0.410(1]; 2 id. CJ 2.06[6] (2d ed. 1970); Clark,
The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924).
20. E.g., McCarthy v. Noren, 370 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1967); Williamson v. Columbia
Gas&: Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951); Wolcott
v. Hutchins, 280 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Koblitz v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 164 F.
Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), afjd. per curiam, 266 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1959).
21. Ratner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
22. Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S.
28 (1966).
23. It should be noted that involuntary dismissals predicated on certain procedural
defaults peculiar to the derivative plaintiff, such as failure to satisfy a precondition of
the suit, see notes 13-17 supra, are not judgments on the merits. Thus, a dismissal
predicated upon failure to join the corporation as a party, see Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. CIV. P. 41, or failure to establish the
court's jurisdiction, see Marcus v. Textile Banking Co., 38 F.R.D. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
does not carry res judicata effect. The principle is illustrated in Saylor v. Lindsley, 391
F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968). At issue was the loss to the corporation of a mine fraudulently
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the effect of a derivative judgment on nonparticipating shareholders,
foreclosure of the cause carries the same degree of finality afforded to
a more limited, private action24 and no larger grounds for collateral
attack are permitted. Thus, in the absence of fraud or collusion,
even an inadequate derivative judgment, arrived at because of the
plaintiff's negligence or economic inability to more vigorously prosecute the action, serves to bar relitigation of the action. 25
It is the purpose of this Note to examine the adequacy of representation in a derivative suit and to consider the appropriateness of
applying res judicata to foreclose the corporate cause of action. Discussion will focus on the following areas: (1) the problem of the
inadequate plaintiff; (2) the efficacy of judicially created devices
designed to ensure the adequacy of representation; and, (3) the
feasibility of partially exempting the derivative cause of action from
the operation of res judicata.
II.

ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION IN THE DERIVATIVE SUIT

Unlike the more limited personal action, a judgment foreclosing
a derivative cause of action is relevant to the interests of a large
transferred to a second corporation in which the defendant directors held large personal interests. The first suit on this cause was dismissed "with prejudice" for failure
of the plaintiff to post bond guaranteeing defendants' litigation expenses; the dismissal
was upheld on appeal. Hawkins v. Lindsley, 327 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1964). The Hawkins
judgment was then pied by the -defendants as a bar to Saylor's action. The district
court agreed and held that the earlier dismissal "with prejudice" had foreclosed the
action. Saylor v. Lindsley, 274 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The Second Circuit reversed
and held that the Hawkins plaintiff had merely failed to satisfy a requirement necessary to commence the action. The defendants had therefore not been required to defend on the merits of the action and had not been placed in danger of an adverse
judgment. The court concluded that to bar Saylor on the basis of Hawkins' default
would work too harsh a result for another's failure to satisfy a rule of procedure. 391
F.2d at 969.
A related problem arises with regard to involuntary dismissals for failure to prosecute
or to comply with procedural requirements during the course of the litigation. Unless
specifically designated as being "without prejudice," FED. R. Crv. P. 4l(b) provides that
such dismissals are "upon the merits." The Supreme Court has stated in dictum that
FED. R. Crv. P. 4l(b) is to have res judicata effect. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S.
265, 286 (1961). In a recent case, however, the Second Circuit created an exception to
the general operation of that rule:
We hold that, when notice of a proposed dismissal of a stockholder's derivative
suit for failure to answer interrogatories is not given to nonparty stockholders, the
judgment of dismissal does not bar an identical cause of action asserted by a different stockholder in a subsequent derivative suit.
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 256 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
24. See, e.g., Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64, 65 (1st Cir. 1954); Breswick &: Co. v. Briggs,
135 F. Supp. 397, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Ratner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 618,
619 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
25. The frequency with which a corporate claim is inadequately -represented is, by
the nature of the problem, unascertainable. There are many instances, however, in
which shareholders have sought to upset a derivative judgment on the basis of the original plaintiff's alleged ineptitude. See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968);
Phillips v. Bradford, 228 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Ratner v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 6 F.R.D. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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class of persons. The consequences of foreclosing the corporate claim,
likewise spread among that same group, become harsher in direct
proportion to tne number of interests inadequately represented~ Yet,
despite the wide scope of the action, standard rules of res judicata
apply since the corporation, in the form of a plaintiff-shareholder,
has had an opportunity to litigate the merits of the claim. Given the
complexity of the derivative action, however, it is clear that all
plaintiff-shareholders are not equally able or willing to adequately
prosecute the action. This section will discuss some specific problems related to inadequate representation and will examine devices
created to counter the effects of such <;leficiencies. In addition, supplemental proposals to further ensure the adequacy of plaintiff's rep•
resentation will be considered.
A.

The Problem of the Inadequate Plaintiff

In the absence of collusion, the adequacy of plaintiff's representation involves two separate factors. The first may be equated with
the plaintiff's inherent qualifications. Some persons are more vigorous, more knowledgeable and better able to bear the financial
burdens attendant upon such an action. The second relates to the
plaintiff's use of those qualifications through the discovery and presentation of evidence. To the extent that the derivative plaintiff is
deficient in either respect, his representation is inadequate and the
corporate cause may be extinguished without an adequate adjudication. For example, failure to discover facts concerning the nature of
defendant's wrongdoing and the extent of the injuries sustained by
the corporation may lead to an unwarranted judgment for the defendants or an insufficient award for the plaintiff.26
Failure to adequately discover is not always a consequence of
negligence or lack of interest. Discovery, inevitably, is a function of
economics and its effectiveness is often limited by the plaintiff's
inability to pay the attendant expenses. Apart from economics, complex derivative actions present a particular potential for abuse of
the discovery process. A recalcitrant defendant may conceal some
relevant materials from the plaintiff or deliver a mass of quasirelevant but misleading documents. 27 Despite his ability to compel
discovery, even a knowledgeable plaintiff is unlikely to be cognizant
of all relevant documents.28 Correlatively, invocation of the enforce26. In determining the adequacy of a voluntary settlement, the courts place primary
emphasis on whether the settlement figure appears adequate on the basis of the evi-·
dence actually presented, not that which might have been presented. See, e.g., Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 335 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953); Phillips
v. Bradford, 228 F. Supp. 397,401 (5.D.N.Y. 1964).
27. See Comment, Collateral Attack of Judicially-Approved Settlements of Shareliolders' Derivative Suits, 74 YALE L.J. 1140, 1148 (1965).
28. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 341-42 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 28 (1966).
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ment devices29• incorporated into the discovery rules may be expensive, time consuming, and frustrating. Under such circumstances,
it is clear that the derivative cause cannot be adequately adjudicated
by an inept or negligent plaintiff. The fact that courts recognize the
importance of discovery in the derivative context, does not necessarily mean that they will take the initiative in forcing its completion
prior to the entry of a judgment.30
Even when the plaintiff is aware of all relevant facts, it is not
certain that he will be able to properly utilize such information.
Again, the problem is one of vigor, economics and sufficient expertise
to formulate the most appropriate theory of action. Depending on
the particular circumstances, a derivative plaintiff may choose to
predicate his action, for example, on debt, breach of fiduciary duty,
waste, fraud, or violation of any applicable regulatory statute. To the
extent that one form of action more adequately encompasses the
nature of the derivative cause than another, the plaintiff-shareholder
pursuing that alternative may be the most adequate representative of
the corporate interests. 31 As a general proposition, however, foreclosure of a cause of action is not avoided by reference to new
theories of enforcement.32
The problem of the inadequate plaintiff is especially acute if
concurrent suits are brought on the same derivative cause. Not uncommonly, a single breach of fiduciary duty will result in the initiation of several derivative actions in different jurisdictions.33 As a
general proposition, any judgment rendered on the merits of a
corporate cause operates as a bar to all other derivative actions,
whether those competing claims were brought before,34 or during3 5
29. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
30. One court, for example, after permitting a shareholder to initiate a suit in federal court largely because of the superiority of available discovery devices, Ratner v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 339, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), held that same suit
barred by a judgment in state court dismissing a concurrent suit on the same cause of
action. Ratner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 6 F.R.D. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
31. See Breswick Re Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
32. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
33. Derivative litigation over certain transactions of the Alleghany Corporation in•
eluded one suit in Rhode Island state court and ten suits in New York state courts, see
Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed,
11 App. Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960) (approving final settlement), and eleven
suits in federal court, including Breswick Re Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1955). The history of that litigation is summarized in Smith v. Alleghany Corp., 394
F.2d 381, 385-88 (2d Cir. 1968). A series of derivative suits primarily against directors
of Kaiser-Frazer Corporation included actions filed in the state courts of California,
Delaware, Michigan, and federal courts in Delaware, Michigan, and New York. See
Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 317-18 (6th Cir.) (Allen, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
34. Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953).
35. Stella v. Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1954); Ratner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
6 F.R.D. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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the suit on which the judgment was secured. Thus, when the defendant achieves a judgment in one jurisdiction, he may assert, in all
other actions then in progress, that the corporate cause has been
extinguished. In an ideal world, such foreclosure would work little
hardship since the merits of each derivative suit on the same corporate cause are substantially identical. As a practical matter, however, some plaintiffs are more vigorous, resourceful or in a better
economic position to adequately pursue the cause. Corporate defendants may therefore seek to delay all but the least harmful
derivative suit and litigate the issues, or reach a voluntary settlement,
in the most favorable context.36 While some authority indicates that
a concurrent derivative suit will not be forceclosed by a settlement
purposely entered to frustrate a more competent plaintiff,37 it is
unlikely that less blatant examples of "plaintiff-shopping" would
warrant similar treatment. Further, it is equally unlikely that such
a practice would constitute fraud sufficient to upset a judgment on
collateral attack.ss
While the courts have expressed concern that the derivative
cause not be too easily extinguished,39 such an attitude is not a viable
substitute for adequate representation. Thus, the inadequate plaintiff's capacity to foreclose the derivative cause is largely unabated.
The problem, however, cannot be fully understood without a consideration and appraisal of the judicial and statutory devices that are
designed to safeguard adequacy of representation.
36. See Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 323 (6th Cir.) (Allen, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
37. See Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Plaintiffs in
Breswick had filed a derivative suit in federal court concerning various transactions of
the Alleghany Corporation. Similar litigation had been filed by other plaintiffs in the
New York state courts, consolidated as Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191 N.Y.S.2d
840 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App. Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1960) (ap•
proving final settlement). The Breswick plaintiffs, however, "were the first and only
litigants to develop the contention that during the period in question Alleghany was
subject to the Investment Company Act" of 1940, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52
(1970). 135 F. Supp. at 406. This contention had been upheld and an injunction issued
in a related action by the same plaintiffs, Breswick &: Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp.
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Four days after that injunction was issued, the parties to the Zenn
litigation, from which the Breswick plaintiffs had been excluded, announced a stipulation of settlement to terminate Zenn. The federal court, however, noting that the
Breswick plaintiffs "perhaps had been the most vigorous and most successful in the
litigation," 135 F. Supp. at 403, found the Zenn defendants' conduct inequitable and
enjoined them from using the proposed settlement to assert res judicata in Breswick.
See Note, "Enjoining" Res Judicata: The Federal-State Relationship and Conclusiveness of Settlements in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 65 YALE L.J. 543 (1956).
38. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 334 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed,
384 U.S. 28 (1966). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 63(b)(3). See generally Comment, supra note
27.
39. See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1077 (1972); Breswick &: Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Cf.
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Palmer v. Morris, 341 F.2d 577
(5th Cir. 1965).
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Current Devices and Suggested Improvements To
Ensure Adequacy of Representation

It would be unfair to conclude that the courts have been completely oblivious to the problems created by inadequate representation. The courts have formulated a series of measures designed to
protect the corporate cause from undue extinction. Because those
safeguards are generally ineffective, further measures appear necessary to ensure adequacy of representation in the derivative suit.
I. The "Adequate Representation" Standard

As a prerequisite to bringing a derivative action, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.l requires that a plaintiff "fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the shareholders."40 While there are few
cases interpreting that standard, it would seem reasonable to expect
that factors regulating the class action representative would also
apply to the derivative plaintiff.41 At a minimum, an adequate class
representative must have the same interests as the class at large and
have no conflicting interests.42 By requiring that a derivative plaintiff demonstrate shareholder status, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.l and similar state statutes43 go far toward ensuring this basic
level of adequacy.44 Similarly, these technical requirements imposed
40. Compare the language of FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(4), permitting a class action only
if "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class." Prior to the 1966 amendments to the Rules, shareholders' derivative suits were
included as class actions under Rule 23. The single standard applicable to both required plaintiff to "fairly insure the adequate representation of all" members of the
class.
41. See Shnlman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 211 (D.D.C. 1969). Cf. Kauffman v.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). See
also C. WRIGIIT &: A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1833 (1972); Cohn,
The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1226-27 (1966). Note,
however, that the derivative plaintiff need not represent the interests of all shareholders but must fairly and adequately represent the interests of dissenting shareholders. Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 211 (D.D.C. 1969), citing Cohn, supra
at 1227.
42 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940); Traylor v. Marine Corp., 328
F. Supp. 383, 385 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539, 542 (S.D. Miss.
1962), affd. mem., 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). See generally
3B J. MooRE, supra note 18, ,r 23.07[3].
43. See note 14 supra.
44. In some cases, however, the plaintiff's technical compliance with the shareholder
requirement may be so insubstantial in fact that he does not meet the required standard of adequacy. In Amar v. Garnier Enterprises, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 211 (C.D. Cal. 1966),
plaintiff had become a shareholder by purchasing from his cousin an interest barely
sufficient to meet federal jurisdictional requirements, while other shareholders of longer
standing were parties to a concurrent action for dissolution in the state court. The
court found that "[m]ost of the transactions of which Amar complains in his pleading
in this action occurred before he became a shareholder, and his ability to prosecute
with respect to such matters is at least doubtful ••• .'' 41 F.R.D. at 217. The court
accordingly determined that the plaintiff lacked representative capacity. These same
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by the various rules and statutes as preconditions to the derivative
action45 also help to ensure plaintiffs interest in the litigation. In
addition to measuring the representative's objective relation to his
class, the courts have also cited the plaintiffs honesty, vigor, conscientiousness, skill, and competence of counsel46 as relevant components of adequate representation.
'While such considerations would assist in protecting the derivative cause, they are difficult to measure as a threshold matter, and
require the court to make a subjective determination without an
adequate basis for evaluation. The best solution would be for the
court to grant conditional representative status to a derivative plaintiff, subject to revocation. 47 If the plaintiffs representation later
appears inadequate, the court should consider augmenting the
action by requiring notice to other shareholders of plaintiffs inadequacy and permitting intervention,48 or dismissing the action without prejudice to the corporate cause.49 Thus, the court could minimize the possibility that an inadequate plaintiff would foreclose the
derivative cause.

2. Appointment of Independent Counsel
In a further attempt to protect the derivative cause, some courts,
having found a conflict of interest when counsel represents both the
corporation and the alleged wrongdoers, require the appointment
of an independent attorney to represent the corporation.50 Howfactors, of course, also established that the action was "a collusive one to confer jurisdiction" in contravention of FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1, the alternative basis for the court's
dismissal. 41 F.R.D. at 216-17.
45. See notes 15-17 supra.
46. See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 7II, 714 (7th Cir. 1968)
(vigor); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968) (competence of
counsel); Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (D.S.D. 1971) (competence of counsel);
Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 536 (D.N.H. 1971) (competence of counsel); Rodriquez v. Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, 294 (N.D. Ill. 1970), affd.
mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971) (vigor); Carpenter v. Hall, 3ll F. Supp. 1099, lll4 (S.D. Tex.
1970) (integrity and character of representative); Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202,
207 (D.D.C. 1969) (competence of counsel); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v.
Methode Electronics, 285 F. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (integrity and character of
representative).
47. This practice is currently used in class actions. See, e.g., Weisman v. MCA Inc.,
45 F.R.D. 258, 263 (D. Del. 1968); Underwood v. Maloney, 14 F.R.D. 222, 227 (E.D. Pa.
1953); Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 3 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
48. Such a rule is currently incorporated into FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2). See also text
accompanying notes 66-74 infra.
49. Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(d) permits the court, upon finding that the plaintiff is an inadequate class representative, to limit the class to those adequately represented, order
the repre;;entative group to be augmented, or permit the suit to continue as a private
action. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. Mn.I.ER, supra note 41, § 1765. While the nature of the
derivative suit precludes reformation into a private action, the other remedial measures
for class actions seem equally appropriate for derivative suits.
50. See, e.g., Murphy v. Washington American League Base Ball Club, Inc., 324
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ever, those courts have not always outlined procedures sufficient to
guarantee that the "independent" attorney would in fact be free of
the defendant directors' influence.
Basically, the problem involves the method of selection. One
court, for example, while granting plaintiff's motion for the appointment of an independent attorney to represent the corporation, also
concluded that "[t]he fact that the selection of such independent
counsel will necessarily be made by officers and directors who are
defendants does not ... present any insuperable difficulty." 51 However, any such selection by derivative defendants would inevitably
be tainted with elements of self-interest. Alternatively, to permit the
plaintiff to make the selection would constitute a pretrial judicial
determination that the derivative plaintiff is the best judge of the
corporation's interests. A procedure requiring the judge alone to
make such a selection would constitute judicial involvement in internal corporate affairs prior to a showing that such interference is
justified. Further, a procedure which involves both defendant and
plaintiff would not prove satisfactory if the parties are unable to
agree on a mutually acceptable choice. While there appears to be
no simple solution, perhaps the optimal procedure would involve
a two-stage process in which the parties, with judicial supervision,
could attempt to make a mutually acceptable selection. Failing
agreement, the court could appoint such a representative and justify
its interference on the ground that the actions of the parties clearly
indicate an impasse requiring judicial intervention for the limited
purposes of selecting an independent corporate representative.

3. Alignment of the Corporation
Another problem concerning the role of the corporation in the
derivative suit is that of the alignment of parties. As a general rule,
the corporation, an indispensible party to the derivative action,52 is
joined as a defendant. While disregarding the corporation's theoretical identity of interest with the plaintiff, such alignment follows from
the danger that the corporation, which has refused to bring the
action in its own behalf and which is often under the control of the
defendant directors, will be antagonistic to the derivative cause.58
F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246
(D.D.C. 1965); Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Langer v.
Garay, 30 App. Div. 2d 942, 293 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968). But see Otis &: Co. v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 57 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (actual showing of conflict required before independent attorney need be appointed). See also Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privileges in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus. I.Aw. 901 (1969); Osborn, Developments in Corporate Law, 19 Bus. I.Aw. 577, 577-78 (1964).
51. Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
52. See note 17 supra.
53. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95-97 (1957).
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Thus, the plaintiff-shareholder is protected from interference from
hostile parties. On motion, the corporation may, in some cases, be
made a plaintiff.54 As a prerequisite to such realignment, the court
must be satisfied that the corporation recognizes that its interests lie
with the plaintiff,55 that the persons currently in control of the
entity did not share in the alleged wrongdoing,56 and that the court's
jurisdiction will not thereby be destroyed.57 Consequently, realignment is seldom granted,58 and plaintiff's control of the action is not
diluted by the presence of a potentially hostile party. While the
rules regarding alignment of the parties tend to preserve the integrity of the action, they are, at best, a negative safeguard and do
nothing to ensure that the plaintiff-shareholder's representation will
be adequate even in the absence of interference.
4. Intervention of Shareholders
Intervention into a derivative suit will be granted as a matter of
right to an otherwise qualified shareholder only when the interests
of the intervenor are not being "adequately represented" 59 by the
plaintiff-shareholder who initiated the derivative action. 60 When
representation is adequate, permissive intervention may be granted,
but the courts will consider whether the intervenor's participation
will delay the proceedings or prejudice the rights of the original
parties.61
While the intervention of additional shareholders may ensure a
more adequate representation of the derivative cause62 and minimize
54. E.g., Palmer v. Morris, Ml F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1965); In re Penn-Central Sec.
Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Kennedy v. Blumeyer, 309 F. Supp. 939
(E.D. Mo. 1969).
55. E.g., Kennedy v. Blumeyer, 309 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (defendant corporation admitted plaintiff's allegations and had filed comparable suits in state court).
56. E.g., In re Penn-Central Sec. litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (petitioners were court appointed trustees for the bankrupt defendant railroad).
57. E.g., Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1956); Unanue v. Caribbean Canneries Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1971). See also 3B J. MooRE, supra note 18, 1J 23.1.21[1].
58. See 7A C. WRIGHT&: A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 1822.
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
60. "The rule is that representation is adequate if no collusion is shown between
the representative and an opposing party, if the representative does not have or represent an interest adverse to the proposed intervenor and if the representative does not
fail in the fulfillment of his duty." Martin v. Kalvar Corp., 411 F.2d 552, 553 (5th Cir.
1969). See also Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F.R.D. 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1947) (intervention granted when corporation reluctant to prosecute suit begun at shareholder's behest); Duncan v. National Tea Co., 14 Ill. App. 2d 280, 144 N.E.2d 771
(1957) (original plaintiff no longer willing to prosecute).
61. See, e.g., Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967): Degge v. City of Boulder,
336 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1964); Janousek v. Wells, 303 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1962).
62. That attitude was expressed within the context ·of shareholder intervention into
a suit begun by a corporation at the shareholder's behest. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
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opportunities for collusion between a single plaintiff and the derivative defendants, such participation is expensive and, in some circumstances, nonproductive. 63 Unless the motion was granted because
of the plaintiff's inability or unwillingness to protect the cause, at
least partial control of the action will remain with the original
party. 64 Thus, a recalcitrant derivative plaintiff might seek to impair
the intervenor's effective participation by denying him access to
relevant materials.65
The utility of intervention as a safeguard is further limited by
the fact that potential intervenors are not certain to be aware of the
pendency of a derivative suit. Generally, notice is not required to
be given to all shareholders unless and until a volutary settlement
has been proposed. 66 Thus, through entry of an involuntary judgment on the merits, for example, a derivative suit may be dismissed
and the cause foreclosed without any notice to potential intervenors.67 In considering a motion for dismissal on the merits, the plaintiff's opposition to the motion might suggest that there is no further
need to safeguard the derivative cause.68 While such a determination
is presumably based on the notion that the plaintiff, having invested
a great deal of time and effort into prosecuting the action, is not
likely to easily relinquish his derivative claims, it fails to consider
Corp. v. Jenkins, 7 F.R.D. 197, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). There is no reason to believe that
such an attitude will not carry over to the analogous situation of the derivative suit.
63. For purposes of recovering legal expenses, it is unlikely that an intervenor will
be afforded larger rights than those given the original derivative plaintiff: the intervenor must recover something of value for the corporation. See, e.g., Bosch v. Meeker
Cooperative Light&: Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960). The problem
then is determining the meaning of a benefit to the corporation. The probable result
is that the intervenor must recover, by virtue of his objections, an amount beyond
that which the parties would have accepted or that the intervenor must have contributed to the quality of the prosecution leading to a settlement. In either case, the measure is difficult and uncertain.
64. Cf. Breswick &: Co. v. Briggs, 138 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also N. LATTIN, supra note 6, at 377.
65. In such a situation, the intervening party may resort to discovery by invoking
FED. R. Crv. P. 26, which permits any party to take the testimony of any person or party
upon oral or written interrogatories. The scope of permissible matter included "any
matter not privileged, ••• whether it relates to the claim of defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
66. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.I; 3B J. MOORE, supra note 18, 11 23.1.24[2]. But see
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972), requiring
that notice be given of a dismissal pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 4l(b) if res judicata is to
attach.
67. See, e.g., Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 259 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1077 (1972); Daugherty v. Ball, 43 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 1967). See also Haudeck,
The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Derivative Actions-Part I, 22 Sw. L.J.
767, 776-77 (1968).
68. 7A C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 1839 at 436. Cf. Daugherty v. Ball,
43 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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that the plaintiff may be inept or, alternatively, may be feigning
opposition to protect a collusive agreement through entry of a
binding judgment. Lacking notice, nonparty shareholders, not otherwise aware of the derivative action, are denied an opportunity to
intervene and remedy a representative's deficiencies. Correlatively,
absent notice, a more vigorous plaintiff engaged in a concurrent
derivative suit on the same cause of action will not be alerted to
possible foreclosure through judgment or provided an opportunity
to intervene into or consolidate the respective actions. 69
Clearly, then, if intervention is to be an adequate safeguard,
notice should be given of the filing of a derivative suit. While the
form that notice should take is best determined by the court in
light of relevant circumstances, at a minimum it should contain a
statement of the nature of the allegations, provide the identity of the
representative, and be communicated to a reasonable number of
shareholders.70 Because the expense of such notice may deter an
otherwise vigorous representative, the court should be flexible in
taxing that cost. The costs of the notice required in some class action
suits,71 while generally assessed against the plaintiff as the invoking
party,72 have, on occasion, been charged to the defendant. 78 Those
courts have considered as relevant factors "the apparent merit or lack
of merit in the claim ... the number of named plaintiffs and their
financial responsibility ... the ability of plaintiffs to make the initial
outlay required, and, of course, the cost of notice.'' 74

5. Settlement
The most familiar method of concluding a derivative suit is an
agreement among the parties to voluntarily settle the action. Because of the potential for abuse inherent in such a resolution, many
69. See Breswick &: Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (plaintiff excluded from settlement negotiations). See also Note, supra note 37.
70. The most analogous situation is that notice required to be given on the initiation of a class action. See, e.g., Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465
(N.D. Ill. 1967) (publication sufficient notice when class consisted of several hundred
thousand taxpayers); Eisen v. Carlisle 8e Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (pub•
lication and random mailed notices sufficient when class consisted of 2,000,000 persons).
In the derivative context, notices of a voluntary dismissal have also been tailored according to relevant circumstances. See, e.g., J3irdbaum v. Birrell, 17 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (settlement notice to 7500 widely scattered shareholders sufficient when pub•
lished in newspaper and local law journal).
·
71. Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
72. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968); Feder v.
Harrington, 52 F.R.D. 178, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp.
148, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also, 7A C. WRIGHT 8e A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 1788.
73. E.g., Battle v. Municipal Housing Authority, 53 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Berland v. Maclc, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (cost divided between plaintiff and
defendant).
74. Berland v. Maclc, 48 F.R.D. 121, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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authorizing statutes and rules require judicial supervision of settlements.75 Following such an agreement, shareholders must be notified of the proposed settlement and afforded an opportunity to object
to its terms. 76 At the conclusion of the settlement hearing, if all
offered objections are insufficient, judgment will be entered terminating the action. Clearly, the res judicata effect accorded such a
judgment is justifiable only insofar as the hearing presents an adequate forum for dissent. The crucial question in this context is
whether objectors to the settlement have an opportunity to present
their opposition.77
Initially, the objecting shareholder may be confronted by hostility from both the plaintiff and defendant. Once the original
parties have invested a great deal of time and effort in arriving at a
settlement, it is not likely that they will be anxious to continue the
expensive proceedings in order to satisfy a belated objector.78 Given
the amount of time invested in the litigation, the court also has an
interest in protecting the agreed-upon resolution, and the prospect
of continuing the action cannot be expected to excite a great deal
of judicial sympathy.79 Consequently, a shareholder is likely to have
less influence on the court as an objector than he would have had as
a party to the action.80 In practice, then, a heavy burden is placed on
such an objector to rebut the presumption that the offered settlement is a fair resolution.81
The problem becomes more acute, however, should no objection
be made or should the objecting shareholders not appreciate serious
deficiencies in the settlement. While it is arguable that the legislative
intent to protect the action is exhausted by providing an opportunity
to object, it would be difficult to justify judicial tolerance of an
offensive but unchallenged settlement.
Some courts have begun to formulate criteria against which to
measure the adequacy of an offered settlement. One approach has
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CHAN. CT. R. 23.1; MICH. GEN. Or. R. 208.4;
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. I.Aw § 626(d) (McKinney 1963); PA. CT. R. 2230(b).
76. In some situations, all litigating shareholders must be given an opportunity to
participate in settlement negotiations. Breswick 8i: Co. v. Briggs, 135 F. Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
77. See Haudeck, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part II:
The Settlement, 23 Sw. L.J. 763, 803-06 (1969).
78. See Comment, supra note 27, at 1150.
79. See Schwartzman v. Tenneco Mfg. Co., 375 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1967). Cf. Glicken
v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Zenn v. Anzalone, 17 Misc. 2d 897, 191
N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1959), appeal dismissed, 11 App. Div. 2d 938, 210 N.Y.S.2d 748
(1960).
80. For a discussion of the role of the objector, see Haudeck, supra note 77, at 803.
81. On a more practical level, an objecting shareholder may have little opportunity
to prepare a meaningful presentation or may feel deterred by the fact that he will
likely receive no reimbursement for incumbent legal expenses should his objections
fail to enlarge the settlement award. See Haudeck, supra note 77, at 803-06.
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been for the court to request the advice of masters or appropriate
governmental regulatory agencies.82 Recently, one court has presumed a settlement inadequate which results in an award far less
than that originally demanded.83 While such approaches safeguard
the derivative cause in some circumstances, they do not adequately
respond to the problem of the inept plaintiff. However, any greater
judicial involvement would raise serious questions as to the ambit of
the court's review. Were the court to measure the adequacy of the
offered resolution against £acts discovered by the plaintiff, the danger
of inadequate discovery would remain. Yet, given the crowded condition of court dockets and the limited number of court personnel
available for such an investigation, 84 an independent £act-finding
process designed to complement plaintiff's discovery efforts represents a commitment in terms of time and effort that most courts cannot make. Clearly, then, it is difficult to imagine that judicial initiative in the settlement hearing will be more than superficially helpful.
6. Conclusion on Current Safeguards
It is apparent, then, that the current statutory and judicial devices created to safeguard the interests of all parties to the derivative
action are inadequate for that purpose. The interests of the corporation are too easily defeated by the negligence or lethargy of the
derivative representative. I£ the adequacy of plaintiff's representation
was carefully examined as a threshold matter and carefully reevaluated throughout the proceedings, the problem of the inadequate plaintiff might be partially solved. Certainly, a requirement
of notice to all shareholders on the filing of a derivative suit would
be an improvement. But to the extent that the safeguards remain
unsatisfactory responses to the representation problem, alternatives
to the current operation of res judicata should be examined.

III.

TOWARD AN "ADEQUATE PLAINTIFF" TEST

Despite the danger of inadequate representation, it would be
difficult to contend seriously that the derivative suit should be totally
82. See, e.g., Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
912 (1971) (advice of SEC sought by court); Fielding v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) (use of master). The impact of a master's report varies. While the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure discourage the use of masters, FED. R. CIV. P. 53(d), their findings
are conclusive in non-jury trials and are treated as evidence in jury trials. FED. R. CIV.
P. 53(e)(2). In New York, however, reference to masters is more common, but their
report is advisory and not dispositive. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw §§ 4001, 4201, 4212, 4320
(McKinney 1963); Haudeck, supra note 77, at 786.
83. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
But see Whittner v. Ghen, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,I 92,502 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1969).
84. The conditions of the federal dockets were described by Chief Justice Burger in
remarks entitled Has the Time Come?, 55 F.R.D. 119 (1972). See also Hooper, Calendar
and Docket Control in Single Judge Systems, 50 F.R.D. 353 (1970).
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exempted from the operation of res judicata. Res judicata represents
a determination that the importance of protecting defendants and
conserving court energies outweighs the danger that an occasional
party will be denied justice by operation of the rule. 85 Specifically,
the rule is designed to protect the defendant from vexatious lawsuits,
to prevent multiple recovery of damages, to promote the stability of
judgment and to conserve judicial resources.86
Beyond such traditional concerns linger more practical considerations peculiarly applicable to the derivative action. To permit an
unlimited number of suits on the derivative cause would create
serious .financial hardships for the corporate defendant. Successive
derivative suits are certain to adversely affect corporate morale and
cause a loss of reputation and goodwill among the business community. 87 Directors and officers who are defendants or witnesses in
continuous lawsuits are unlikely to be able to discharge their duties
at any level approaching efficiency.88 Endless probes into corporate
affairs and the concurrent inconveniences presented by records being
unavailable would constitute an unjustifiable disruption of corporate
affairs. The resulting loss of corporate efficiency may disrupt the
flow of goods or services and increase production costs.
It is clear, then, that to completely free the derivative action from
res judicata is a deceptively simple, but unjustifiable, resolution. Any
advantages wrought thereby would be undermined by resultant costs,
inefficiencies, and abuses. Alternatively, current rule operation permits foreclosure of the derivative cause before the corporate claim is
fully litigated. The optimal compromise would be for the court to
measure the adequacy of plaintiff's representation both before and
during the derivative suit.89 Given the complexity of the derivative
suit, however, a representative's inadequacies are not certain to become apparent during the course of the proceedings.
Because an inadequate derivative plaintiff threatens the interests
85. Thus, through plaintiff's failure to demand complete relief, "Defendant may
continue to sleep in Plaintiff's bed though not under Plaintiff's bed-quilts. Defendant
may continue to occupy Plaintiff's real estate though Plaintiff has a judgment awarding him possession." Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
86. See lB J. MooRE, supra note 18, ,r 0.405[1]; Cleary supra note 85, at 344-49.
Despite courts' concern that judicial resources not be expended in unnecessary relitigation of actions, res judicata is an affirmative defense which must be invoked by
the defendants. See DAC Uranium Co. v. Benton, 149 F. Supp. 667 (D. Colo. 1956).
While the pleading requirement prevents the defendant from objecting to a second
suit after that judgment has been proven less advantageous than the first, as a practical
matter, defendants will rarely fail to plead the defense.
87. See Note, Control Over Settlements of Shareholders' Suits, 54 HARV. L. R.Ev. 833,
834 (1940). While the arguments presented therein pertain to settlement before trial,
they apply with equal force to multiple suit situations,
88. See Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
832 (1953).
89. See text accompanying notes 40-49 .supra.
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of all shareholders, the courts should consider partially exempting
the derivative action from the operation of res judicata.90 Thus, a
second shareholder would be permitted to relitigate the claim by
demonstrating the inadequacy of the initial corporate representative
and by satisfying the court that the derivative cause was inadequately
adjudicated.01 While any standard employed to measure the adequacy of a plaintiff's representation would inevitably require some
refinement, the court should consider plaintiff's vigor, knowledge,
use of evidence and discovery, the experience of counsel, and the
disparity between the settlement award and the amount originally
demanded. Because relitigation of the derivative claims would pose
serious threats to court efficiency, the petitioning shareholder should
be required to rebut a heavy presumption that the initial plaintiff
was an adequate representative. Thus, for example, he could be required to demonstrate that plaintiff failed to discover relevant evidence which a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed. Should the
presumption of adequacy be rebutted, the derivative judgment
would be opened and both parties allowed to relitigate the derivative claim.92
To partially exempt the derivative cause of action from operation
of res judicata clearly would mark a departure from the general foreclosing effects of a judgment. However, such an exception is not
90. While they are similar in many respects, there are sufficient differences between
class actions and derivative suits to warrant affording shareholders the opportunity to
relitigate the corporate action while denying that privilege to class representatives.
Initially, it should be noted that the derivative plaintiff enforces a secondary claim
belonging to the corporation while the class action plaintiff represents a large number of personal claims. Thus, the real parties in interest in a class action, the members
of the class, may personally object to the adequacy of a voluntary settlement. In the
derivative context, however, the corporation, often controlled by the defendants, must
rely on others to object to the adequacy of plaintiff's representation. Further, neither
the derivative plaintiff nor potential objectors or intervenors have a direct pecuniary
interest in the litigation and benefit only insofar as the award effects the value of
their interests. While the plaintiff may conspire to split legal fees with the attorney, judicial supenision of such fees tends to minimize the problem. See, e.g., Green v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 326 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1964); Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185 (1st
Cir. 1959). In contrast, the class action representative has a direct personal interest in
the outcome of the litigation and is, to that extent, likely to vigorously protect that interest. Finally, it should be noted that the class actions authorized pursuant to FED. R.
CtV. P. 23(b)(3) allow class members to exclude themselves from the class and bring a
private action on the same cause. Because only the corporation has a claim in the
derivative suit, no such option is available to shareholders wishing to preserve their
right to sue on that claim at a later date.
91. Presumably, the initial plaintiff would be barred by the previous judgment.
Clearly, a plaintiff should not be allowed to relitigate by denigrating the quality of his
0,1111 representation.
92. The defendants, then, should be entitled to "set-off" the damages recovered in
the first suit or to recover the difference, if any, by which the first award exceeded the
second. Given the fact that the second plaintifi must offer tangible evidence that the
amount recovered in the initial action was less than actual damages sustained by the
corporation, however, the defendant's right to relitigate is not likely to result in damages lower than those awarded in the first suit.
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without precedent. For example, res judicata has, on occasion, been
held not to foreclose a second action when a judgment produced an
absurd result93 or caused an unreasonable hardship to the complaining party.94 Suspensions of the rule, however, are permitted only
when the court is satisfied that such relief will not result in the relitigation of a large number of suits.95 While this latter consideration
would bar relief to nonparties seeking to upset a class action judgment and relitigate the issues as a personal suit, it would not affect
the derivative action. Because the derivative suit is based on a single
claim, not a collection of claims as in the class action, suspension of
res judicata would result in the relitigation of but one cause of
action. Further, such relitigation would be permitted only after a
finding by the court that the initial plaintiff was an inadequate
representative.
To partially exempt the derivative suit from res judicata is not
inconsistent with expanding judicial concern that the derivative suit
should not be too easily extinguished.96 For example, plaintiff's failure to satisfy rules of procedure or preconditions to the action have
been considered an insufficient basis upon which to predicate a foreclosing judgment.97 Similarly, in Papilsky v. Berndt,98 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals specifically exempted the derivative cause
from the normal operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4l(b).
The court noted that such a dismissal, without notice to all shareholders, would allow collusive parties to terminate the action without
judicial supervision.99 Further, the court suggested that such foreclosure would raise a significant question of due process.100 While
Papilsky is limited in scope, the tenor of the court's remarks indicates recognition of the need for more adequate measures to safeguard the derivative cause.
One problem is the possibility that the parties to the first action
will respond to the threat of relitigation by prolonging the action in
order to build a record of adequate representation. Such a tactic is
unlikely to be productive, however, as mere delay will do nothing
more than illustrate the quality of plaintiff's representation. If
93. Adams v. Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 104 N.E.2d 267 (1952).
94. Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 23, 194 P.2d 1 (1948). State ex rel White Pine
Sash Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 576,261 P. 110 (1927).
95. Adams v. Pearson, 411 Ill. 431, 435, 104 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1952); State ex rel
White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 576,579,261 P. 110, 113 (1927).
96. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); Papilsky v. Berndt, 466
F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972); Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965
(2d Cir. 1968).
97. See, e.g., Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1968); Philipar v. Derby, 85
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1936).
98. 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
99. 466 F.2d at 259.
100. 466 F.2d at 259-60.
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the defendant seeks to assist the plaintiff in order to create the appearance of adequacy, any resulting judgment would, of course, be
subject to attack as fraudulent. To the extent that such delay results
in a more complete adjudication of the corporation's claim, however,
the problem of inadequate representation will be avoided without
resort to a second derivative suit.
While partially exempting the derivative action from full foreclosure would create some problems in terms of judicial economy,
the extent of such additional effort is uncertain. Clearly, if all derivative suits are relitigated, the burden on the courts would be prohibitive. Because the petitioning shareholder must rebut a heavy presumption favoring the adequacy of the initial action, however, not
all derivative judgments will be set aside. Moreover, the courts already expend some effort in rebuffing shareholders seeking to begin
or continue derivative suits based on a cause of action foreclosed
through current operation of res judicata. 10 1 In a situation in which
a shareholder can demonstrate the inadequacy of the initial action,
however, the additional burden required to repair the injury done
to the corporation by the defendants and to the corporate cause by
the original plaintiff would seem justified.

101. See note 25 supra.

